Dr Tristan Ewins
In today’s ‘modern Left’ ‘Zionism’ is often taken as a term of abuse. The oppression and dispossession of the
Palestinians is widely seen as negating the very right of the ‘Jewish State’ to
exist. Judah Magnes himself is commonly
dismissed in modern Zionism as a ‘destructive and naïve influence’. (we will discuss these claims at some
length) But Magnes’s legacy ; as well
as the legacy of others such as Hannah Arendt and Martin Buber ; show “another
kind of Zionism is possible”. On the
other hand, modern anti-Zionism is itself at best naïve in believing that the
defeat of the Jewish state would lead to a secular, democratic, pluralistic and
inclusive Palestine. There is a cycle of revenge and Terror going back
from before Israel’s formation, and to
the current day. Modern right-Zionism (including
in the Revisionist legacy of Likud ; which follows after the Irgun Zionist
faction) presumes that conciliation is impossible ; that only Israel will stand
for its own interests ; and that political and military ruthlessness is the
only road to survival.
Though his
binationalism is often held by dissenters in opposition to modern Zionism, it
is forgotten often that Magnes himself was a Zionist. Raised in the United States, Magnes adopted a
pacifist posture during the horrors of World War One. He also adopted what he saw as American
ideals of democracy and pluralism. But
Magnes also came to oppose assimilation in the US amongst Jews most strongly.
Though he was later identified as a liberal Reform Rabbi, he was Conservative
in the sense of holding strongly to Jewish tradition and a strong Jewish
identity. His compromise position became
known as 'cultural Zionism'. (Kotzin, p
119) For Magnes a pluralistic US could
accommodate Jewish nationalism (Zionism) within a broader national identity.
As Daniel
P.Kotzin argues: “His “progressive”
“Zionist ideal” reveals “a larger agenda”. Hence: “Magnes was trying to fashion
American Jews as an ethnic group wherein diversity was possible within a construct of Jewish solidarity.” He “forged” “an ethical-liberal Zionist
ideal” based on “his cultural Zionism, Reform Judaism and American progressive
ideals that combined ethical universalism with Jewish particularism within a
pluralistic framework.” Magnes wanted
Arab “national autonomy in equilibrium with Jewish national autonomy.” (Kotzin, pp 5-6)
But in his
eagerness to preserve Jewish identity, Magnes had sympathy for the Orthodox
position as well. Indeed, Magnes openly
embraced Zionism at a time when many Jews in America were not willing to make
the same leap. Importantly, Magnes came
to support the ‘Jewish Defence Association’ (JDA) which aimed to arm Jewish
communities to defend against pogroms and the like. (Kotzin, p 66) He tried to embrace Chanukah as a
celebration of Jewish nation-hood. He
also embraced the teaching of Yiddish as part of a “cultural Zionist
program” which actually promoted unity
instead of fragmentation. (Kotzin, p 73)
Specifically,
Magnes supported a Jewish national home in Palestine as opposed to proposals
for elsewhere – like Uganda. But
importantly, he felt it was essential to
come to an understanding with Palestine’s Arab residents ; to consult with them
and arrive at a kind of co-determination.
Rather than
pure majoritarianism, Magnes promoted ‘deliberative democracy’ within the
broader Jewish community as the road to unity.
His perspective of ‘equal opportunity’ extended to Arabs in Palestine ;
and for him a large Arab community there had to be accepted and worked
with. (Kotzin, pp 135-140)
During World
War One Magnes defended civil liberties and free speech in the context of his pacifism. He also came to oppose the ‘Red Scare’
following the Bolshevik Revolution.
Following World War One, the Balfour declaration –
establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine – heightened tensions between
Jews and Arabs. Arabs launched
anti-Jewish riots in Palestine. Some Zionists
thought Jewish migration would bring benefits to Arab society and thus would
eventually be accepted. But the Zionist
Organisation of America held that “the land, natural resources and public
utilities would be owned by Jews, and all schools would be conducted in
Hebrew.” By contrast Magnes interpreted
Jewish ethics as “radical pacifism”. (Kotzin,
pp 155-156) He only reconsidered this uncompromising
pacifism in the context of World War Two and the threat posed by Hitler.
Again, Magnes’ position on ‘national self-determination’
translated as co-determination between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. For Magnes:
“[the] very prestige and reputation of the Jewish nation, which
presented itself as liberal and ethical, depended on this.”
Upon migrating to Palestine, Magnes was appointed as
Chancellor of the Hebrew University which was being established there.
The Faculty of Humanities opened in 1928. Magnes also promoted the teaching of Yiddish
language and culture ; though conducted in Hebrew. He thought it was important
to be inclusive while establishing Hebrew as the national language. But many protested - finding Yiddish a
threat to Hebrew culture. Magnes wanted
the Hebrew University to be inclusive of all
Jewish culture – ancient and modern. (Kotzin, p 194-196)
The British tried to appease both Jews and Arabs ; and in the
1920s said they had no intention of creating a Jewish State. Transjordan was established in an appeal to
Arabs. Arab resistance was minimal by 1924.
BUT critical of the other Zionists’ willingness to
compromise with the British, the
controversial Zionist Vladimir Jabotinsky resigned from the World Zionist
Executive in January 1923. Jabotinsky recognised the existence of Arab
nationalism, but he believed Jews had a moral right to Palestine. Declaring a maximalist Zionist objective, he
demanded a Jewish State that included Transjordan. According to him, Arabs must
accept the inevitability of Zionism. Once they did they could live peacefully
with Jews in a Jewish State.” Jabotinsky
called his new movement "Revisionist Zionism”. (Kotzin, p 197)
In response, “Arthur Rippon, a member of the World Zionist
Executive who was also active in the expansion of Jewish settlement in
Palestine, presented a program for a Binational Palestine at the 1925 Zionist
Congress. He argued that Jews should work with Arabs to obtain their consent to
the Zionist movement rather than engaging in an endless conflict.” (Kotzin, p
197)
Hans Kohn and Robert Weltsch, students of Martin Buber –
along with their mentor – believed co-operation with Arabs could be achieved by
renouncing any exclusive claim to Palestine.
They believed in a Zionism based on ethics and justice that “transcended
mere political aims.” An organisation called “Brit Shalom” (Covenant of Peace)
was established. Magnes built relations
with the members of Brit Shalom. Though
he did not join. (Kotzin, p 198)
With the rise of Nazism in Germany Magnes feared that Jews were threatened with “Systematic
extermination”. He wanted the University to be a refuge for Jewish scholars.
(Kotzin, p 213-214)
But as a binationalist,
Magnes was willing to let go the dream of a Jewish State for a reality of
liberal democracy ; where Palestine was ‘the Jewish national home’ ; but where
Arabs and Jews lived and governed together as equals. He believed in the Israeli nation’s
“ability to act as a moral and liberal beacon for the world.” And he believed Arabs and Jews should actually
support and assist each other in their national aspirations. Though secretly,
Magnes feared Arabs would stop Jewish migration outright if given the
chance. (Kotzin, p 220, pp 226-227)
Magnes enunciated “three conditions” as a framework for
Zionism in Palestine: “the right for Jews to immigrate to Palestine based on
the country’s economic absorptive capacity, the rights for Jews to buy and sell
land in Palestine, and the right for Jews to build their own cultural and
religious institutions in Palestine.” (Kotzin, p 224)
But as Kotzin explains:
“such views had little meaning for the Zionist
leadership, and in their eyes had no tactical merit.” “They viewed him as a rogue American Jew, one
who could have dangerous influence because of his connections but who acted
recklessly, without respect for official bodies like the Jewish Agency and
without consideration for the political consequences of his actions.” (Kotzin, p 221)
In 1928/1929 there was an Arab/Jewish dispute over the
Western Wall. This led to Arab attacks
on Jews. Over a week 133 Jews and 116 Arabs were killed, and many others
wounded. Labor Zionists made comparisons
with pogroms in Russia. Most rejected the need for Jewish/Arab co-operation.
(this was seen as unrealistic) As Kotzin explains: “Jews who called for peace
and understanding, like the members of Brit Shalom, were condemned on the
streets of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem in the belief that they demonstrated Jewish
weakness, not Jewish strength.” (Kotzin,
p 222)
P 233 “[Chaim]
Weizmann, while sympathetic to Magnes’s ideas, found his political tactics
problematic. Magnes ignored the fragile political situation” and hence could
“damage…the Zionist project.” He
believed “Arab intransigence” made it “impossible to negotiate with them.” He accused Manges of “breaking our united
front”. Some Arabs tried to play Magnes
off against other Zionists, depicting the others as “extremists”. (Kotzin, p 233)
Stephen Wise also feared Magnes was turning liberal opinion
against Zionism in the US. Zionists were
worried at the prospect of democratic institutions before there was a Jewish
majority. But moderate Opposition Arabs
within ‘the Arab Executive’ had long favoured co-operation with Jews and wanted
to defeat the Grand Mufti (of Jerusalem) – who was to go so far as to
collaborate with Hitler. (Kotzin, pp 234-235)
The rise of Hitler in Germany accelerated Jewish migration
into the tens of thousands – over 66,000 in 1935. By 1936 Jews were more than one fourth of
the population in Palestine. Arabs
feared this ; including migration and land purchases ; but turned most of their
anger against the British. Meanwhile
Revisionist Zionists promoted a hate campaign against Ben-Gurion and the Labor
Zionists for their willingness to negotiate with the Arabs. David Ben-Gurion now felt the improved
Zionist position would force Arabs to the table. Revisionism began to retreat at this time as
well. (Kotzin, P 247-248)
But Ben-Gurion still had an end objective of a Jewish State
as opposed to Magnes’ ‘Binational’ state.
Magnes was desperate to make a difference. In negotiations Magnes was interested if
Arabs would be willing to compromise on Palestinian Arab national aspirations
for the sake of broader Pan Arab aspirations. (pp P 250 -251)
Magnes and
the Partition Plain
During 1935-37 the British developed a partition plan ; to
partition Palestine and Transjordan between Jews and Arabs. Some thought the proposed Jewish State was
too small ; but for Ben-Gurion the prospect of sovereignty was appealing. American Zionists led by Stephen Wise opposed
the plan as the proposed Jewish State could not absorb all Jewish migrants – it
was too small. For his part Magnes was
partly sympathetic – but feared partition could sow the seeds of future
war. Magnes came around to Felix
Warburg’s anti-partition perspective. (Kotzin, Pp 259-260)
Instead Magnes proposed “a binational state” to the Jewish
Agency – as an alternative to partition.
He “believed that he could make Zionist discussions about democracy and
establishing solidarity with the Arabs.” (Kotzin, P 261)
He feared if Zionism neglected the importance of “consent” it
would become “oppressive”. Ha-Kibbutz
Haartzi shel Hashomer Hatzair (“The Country-wide Kibbutz of the Young Guard”)
accepted the principle of binationalism, but under conditions of a Jewish
majority. They believed worker
solidarity could overcome Arab-Jewish conflict.
(Kotzin, P 262)
While Magnes focused on Jewish-Arab relations he was also
strongly concerned in the mid to late 30s with the situation of Jews in Europe
and especially Germany. He came to the
view that Jews must free themselves from dependence on Britain because Britain
was susceptible to Arab influence for strategic purposes at their time of
greatest need.
Jews attempted to subvert British immigration
restrictions. Magnes became a mediator
between the Haganah (an organisation of Jewish self-defence and illegal
immigration) and the British. Despite
his pacifism Magnes supported WWII as ‘a war for humanity’. He said “the
incarnation of the Devil sits on the German throne.” When pressed hard he chose “the preservation
of the Jewish people over his pacifist ideals”.
In the midst of World War Two Magnes combined with over a hundred
other like-minded individuals to form the ‘Ihud’ (‘unity’ or ‘union’) organisation – which favoured a
binational solution as opposed to partition.
Progressive Zionists wanted to find a solution “that would
open up Palestine for European Jewry but would not infringe on Arab
rights.” Many who were already sympathetic to “the
notion of a binational Palestine” “became more overt supporters” of Ihud ;
though others didn’t want to be linked with Ihud “in the public mind”. By 1942 most American Zionists believed free
migration and a Jewish State in Palestine had become necessary. (Kotzin, p 294)
But after the war Magnes did not endorse the offensive
(military and terroristic) strategies against the British. He opposed “offensive violence”. Following the Holocaust many Jews demanded control
over Jewish migration to Palestine, but Magnes believed a peaceful Palestine
was better for Jews in the end.
(Kotzin, pp 274-276) In short,
the Holocaust changed everything ; and linked the creation of a Jewish State
with an existential question of Jewish survival. Magnes’ binational vision was progressively
sidelined.
Magnes was in the end proven correct that partition and a ‘Jewish
State’ would lead to war. But the Jewish
State managed to survive regardless. However, the Yom Kippur war of 1973
demonstrated that Israel’s security was in some ways still precarious ; and should Israel lose any broader conflict
with Arab nations Jews would probably be treated no better than Arabs were
treated with the Palestinian ‘Nakba’.
(the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians)
Leading up to the creation of modern Israel, Kotzin explains how:
“Whereas [Magnes] was previously portrayed as
a fool, now he was characterised as an ‘anti-Zionist’, a traitor to the Jewish
people and the Zionist cause.” Hevdah
Ben-Israel thought he “was a traitor advocating an insane idea.” “Zionists increasingly insisted that the very existence of the Jewish people
depended on acting with power and strength, which would be undermined by
compromise.” (Kotzin, p 288)
Kotzin explains how both Arab and Jewish leaders failed to
back binationalism in practice. “Magnes’s Reform Judaism and Buber’s religious
socialism both emphasised that religious morality must influence politics.” “They hoped Ihud would introduce moral and
ethical values into the politics of the Arab-Jewish conflict.” Magnes suggested a universalism based on a
“Strong Jewish identity” ; while Buber claimed the Jewish nation had a
“supernational task” of becoming “a true people” by submitting to God’s demands
of “truth and righteousness”.
“According to Buber, Jews will be a “humanitarian nation” if they say
“we will not do more injustice to others than we are forced to do in order to
exist. Only by saying this do we begin to be responsible for life.” (Kotzin, pp 297-299)
Magnes was convinced there was an Arab constituency for peace
– but that they were cowed by ‘internal Terror’. Together with others like Martin Buber and Hannah
Arendt he attempted to form a ‘loyal opposition’ to the mainstream Zionist
position from within Zionism. Towards
the end of his life, Magnes continued to promote federalism as a solution to
the conflict. He was glad to see a
national home for the Jews created with Israel’s declaration of Independence ;
but was deeply troubled by the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Arab
refugees. Sadly, while he had spent a
great deal of time in the old Palestine, he passed away outside of Israel and
never set foot in the newly created state.
In the 1940s Magnes
lost support because “he failed to understand…that the Arab-Jewish conflict was
no longer [considered the] primary concern.”
(instead the focus shifted to the Holocaust, Nazism, refugees) Kotzin concludes that “by not focusing on
the best means to help Jewish refugees, he failed to sell the binational plan.”
Today, though, a two-state solution seems a long way away. Jerusalem is united
; and Zionist leaders loathe to consider significant compromise. It seems there
may be ‘one Jewish state’ ; but without meaningful co-determination or mutual
recognition between Jews and Palestinians. But with the Two State Solution
retreating, the project of One State based on co-determination deserves serious
reconsideration. Today - with the rejection of Zionism on most of the Left – it
is easy to forget that those such as Magnes, Arendt and Buber were also
Zionists. Jewish security could be
preserved with a monopoly on the apparatus of force ; but with structures of
self-governance and identity for both Jews and Palestinians beyond that. For instance, Arabs have always been at the
margins of Israeli democracy. That needs
to change in a binational state which is at the same time a safe haven and
Jewish National Home. ‘Deliberative’ and
inclusive democracy as the way forward.
And the Israeli Left
needs to become a voice for co-existence and co-determination over the long
term.
Magnes stands as an
example which demonstrates for the broad Left that not all Zionism ought be ‘tarred
with the same brush’. Hence “Zionism”
ought not be a ‘term of abuse’ on the Left. Though the obstacles are great ; with
cautious hope the kind of mutual recognition and coexistence imagined by Magnes
may still prevail over the long term.
Bibliography:
Kotzin, Daniel.P
, ‘Judah L.Magnes – An American Jewish Non-Conformist’, Syracuse, New York, 2010
Loewenstein, Anthony ; ‘My Israel Question’ ; Melbourne University
Press, Melbourne, 2006
Warburg, James.P
, ‘Crosscurrents in the Middle East’, Gollancz, London, 1969
